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Abstract
We use a panel of European firms to investigate the relationship between intangible assets and produc-
tivity. We disentangle between tfp and technology adoption, while available studies so far have considered
only a notion of productivity conflating the two effects. To this aim, we estimate production function param-
eters allowing, within each sector, for the existence of multiple technologies. We find that intangible assets
both push the firm towards better technologies (technology adoption effects) and allow for a more efficient
exploitation of a given technology (tfp effects).
Keywords: TFP, intangible assets, firm heterogeneity, firm selection, technology adoption, mixture models.
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1 Introduction
By encompassing all those firms’ assets lacking physical existence (including the quality of management, cus-
tomer loyalty, information infrastructure, trade secrets, research and development (hereinafter R&D), and, more
in general, the company’s intellectual capital), intangible assets can be considered as the knowledge base of a
firm. As such, intangibles are often found to be a relevant dimension in modern knowledge intensive production
(see, among others, Bontempi and Mairesse (2008), O’Mahony and Vecchi (2009) and Marrocu et al. (2011)).
However, once one moves beyond the general statement that intangibles are important to a firm’s performance,
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it remains unclear whether they affect total factor productivity (hereinafter tfp), through improving the ability
to exploit “traditional” inputs (i.e. physical capital and labour), or if they also influence firm’s technology
adoption, that is they help the firm at identifying and adopting more productive technologies. While it seems
reasonable to expect that both channels matter, the relationship between intangibles, tfp and technological
choices of firms has not received so far a systematic investigation.
To shed light on this issue, we use mixture models to disentangle between technology and tfp at the firm
level, and then study to what extent they can be explained by the level of intangible assets, as well as by a
number of other firm-, sector-, region- and country-specific variables.
In our terminology, technology and tfp are distinct but closely related issues. Both are measures of the
ability to produce as much output as possible, given the amount of inputs, but, while the former has a firm-level
nature, the latter can be either common to a number of firms or specific to a given firm, in case she owns a
particular production technology.
To help the definition of terms, let us anticipate the formal description and consider the following production
function:
Yi,t = Ai,t
N∏
n=1
(Xn,i,t)
βn,s (1)
where Ai,t is firm i’s tfp (i.e. “Solow residual”) at time t, Xn,i,t denotes the amount of input n used by firm i
at time t, βn,s is the associated production coefficient, and Yi,t denotes produced output. Index s is introduced
to refer to a specific “technology”, with s = 1, . . . , S and S denoting the number of available technologies.
According to (1), the world we have in mind is one in which different production functions identify different
technologies by differing in their production coefficients. Several technologies are available in each sector-
industry, with a number of firms using each technology.
According to (1), given the amount of inputs, how much output firm i is able to produce depends on two
factors: the first one (Ai,t) is firm-specific, the other (βn,s) is intrinsic to the adopted technology and is common
to all the firms that use the same technology. The group of firms sharing a given technology may or may
not coincide with the industry. While firms’ choices concerning these two factors are sometimes referred to as
technological choices and sometimes referred to as productivity choices, we will reserve the term “technology”
to refer to the term βn,s and will talk about tfp with regard to Ai,t.
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In this paper, we use data on a large sample of European manufacturing firms, observed over the 2003-2009
period and nine sectors, to estimate the production function parameters in (1) allowing, within each sector,
for the existence of a higher and a lower technology. Specifically, we first employ mixture models to estimate
the production function parameters in (1), then use a first order stochastic dominance criterion to identify the
“higher” technology, then, for each firm, we compute the tfp component in (1) as the difference between actual
and predicted output, given technology adoption. This allows us to identify, for each firm, her technological
choice (i.e. higher versus lower technology), as well as an individual tfp term which measures her relative
position on the tfp distribution, within the group of firms adopting the same technology. We then investigate,
separately, the effect of intangibles on both counts.
The choice to focus on intangibles has a technical motivation. An appropriate productivity analysis at the
firm level would require detailed information on firms’ produced quantities or, with only firms’ sales available,
detailed information on firms’ prices, so to be able to deflate properly. With this data, the obvious candidate
for measuring the firm’s effort to increase output, given input levels, would be a firm’s spending in R&D.
However, it is well known that, with only a few notable exceptions (e.g. Foster et al., 2008), information on
produced quantities is hardly available, and the data we use here, in this respect, are not exception. As in
the vast majority of cases, we thus have a “revenue productivity” measure as dependent variable,1 with the
consequence that the empirical specification of the relationship of interest de facto mixes quantity and price
effects. In this case, firm’s intangibles are more consistent with the dependent variable we use and should yield
more consistent results. R&D is in fact only one of the many activities available to firms to get an effect on
a revenue-based dependent variable. Expenditures aimed at improving the quality of management, customer
loyalty, and information infrastructure - i.e. ultimately the firm’s endowment of intangible assets - are all (to
a greater or lesser extent “sunk”) costs that a firm can pay to try to enhance her relative market position. It
is worth noting that the whole literature focusing on innovation (measured through R&D) and productivity,
recently surveyed by Hall (2011), is subject to this critique.2
The contribution of our study is twofold.
First, we acknowledge that neglecting the presence of different (within-sector) technologies results into biased
1In the attempt to reduce this problem, we use country-sector specific deflators for Y and K. However, this does not fully
remove the bias related to cross-firms price heterogeneity.
2This strand of literature mostly relies on various specification of Crepon et al. (1998), also known as CDM model, and usually
focuses on labour productivity effects.
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firm-level tfp estimates. To tackle this problem we suggest a novel approach to disentangle empirically between
technology and tfp using econometric techniques, while available studies so far have considered only a notion of
productivity conflating the two effects.
Second, we show that intangibles have a positive and statistically significant effect on both the probability of
choosing a high technology and the tfp level. Moreover, we find that also other firm level variables, such as firm
size and being listed, exert a significant influence, along with region and country level factors. In particular,
regional levels of R&D and regional accessibility have a positive - although small - effect on high technology
adoption and tfp. Average labour costs and corporate governance institutions further influence technology and
tfp, while employees protection laws only affect tfp, given technology adoption.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe how our analysis contributes to economic
literature. Although our theoretical motivation stems from the theoretical literature on trade with heterogenous
firms, initiated by Bernard et al. (2003) and Melitz (2003), both our methodological and empirical contributions
can easily fit into the economic literature in other fields. We thus avoid refer to the related literature in the main
text, and prefer to concentrate field-specific theoretical motivations and contributions in a dedicated section.
In Section 3, we apply mixture models to production function estimation and obtain firms’ technology choices
and tfp values. In Section 4 we measure the impact of intangibles on, separately, technology adoption and tfp.
Section 5 reports several robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical motivation and related literature
Our theoretical motivation stems from the so called “New New Trade Theory” (henceforth NNTT), pioneered
by Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003), and further developed by Bernard et al. (2007b), Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008), Chaney (2008).3
This literature revitalized trade economists’ interest in the Shumpeterian mechanism of firm selection, with
the latter taking place on the basis of firms’ tfp. In a typical NNTT model, firms are assumed to pay a sunk
cost, usually thought of as an irreversible investment in R&D, in order to start production and obtain an initial
level of tfp drawing it from a common tfp distribution. In the original NNTT formulation, firms are not allowed
3Several surveys of this literature have been published. See, in particular: Bernard et al. (2007a); Greenaway and Kneller
(2007).
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to re-draw their tfp level, thus they can afford to keep serving the market only provided that they are productive
enough to price below a certain level, which is endogenously determined by the process of firm selection. In
such process, which is driven by a combination of import and export market competition, winners and losers
emerge, with more productive firms earning handsome profits, mediocre ones lower profits, and the worst soon
vanishing, being unable to cover their production costs with revenues, due to a too low tfp.4
Thanks to the empirical evidence produced to date (see Wagner (2012) for a survey), this firm selection
process is now a stylized fact. However, an issue which still requires some empirical effort is the logic behind the
productivity assignment. In this respect, the original NNTT formulation and the bulk of more recent NNTT
advancements provides different interpretations. As said, in the original NNTT formulation, firms are not
allowed to re-draw their productivity level. A clear-cut consequence of this assumption is that firms self-select
into any status associated with costly operational activities - e.g. exporting, doing foreign direct investments
or R&D, etc. - on the basis of their productivity levels, with the most productive firms potentially involved in
all the activities. Thus there is causality nexus running from productivity to e.g. export status or R&D levels.
This circumstance is well documented by Bustos (2011), who relates Argentinean firms’ technology upgrading
to the reduction in Brazilian tariffs on entry in the export market. Differently, more recent contributions to
NNTT theory have been relaxing such assumption by allowing firms to pay additional (sunk) costs over time,
in order to “re-draw” their tfp. Such costs are modeled as irreversible investment in innovation, typically R&D.
Atkeson and Burstein (2010), for instance, allow for process and/or product innovation, with firms facing a given
probability of improving or worsening their productivity. Navas-Ruiz and Sala (2007) have a modified Melitz
model with innovation activity resulting in lower variable costs and higher implementation costs. Costantini
and Melitz (2008) model technology adoption in a dynamic framework with idiosyncratic uncertainty and sunk
costs. Aw et al. (2008) bring to the data a model in which R&D investment, through its effect on future
productivity, increases the profits from exporting, and participation in the export market raises in turn the
return to R&D investments. They find that export participation can be seen as one component of a broader
investment strategy by the firm. All in all, the novelty in these contributions consists of suggesting the presence
of endogenous “innovation dynamics” at the firm level.
4In this context, the productivity of the marginal firms (i.e. those firms that generate revenues barely sufficient to cover their
costs) defines the threshold below which it is impossible for a firm to survive in the market. This survival threshold is a crucial
variable, since every parameter that influences the average productivity of active firms does so by shifting the threshold.
5
A key difference between the original NNTT formulation and the more recent specifications with innovation
dynamics is that, with the latter, causality between innovation and productivity should in principle run both
ways. On the contrary, under the original “once and forever draw” assumption, only the more productive firms
can find it profitable to invest in innovation. As a consequence, understanding to what extent firms’ innovation
choices do have an impact on their productivity is key for opting in favor or against the “once and forever”
assumption. The research question is thus whether firms’ innovation policy do have an impact on their tfp or
not.
We next explain how we contribute to this literature.
We start by noting that, while an economically significative impact of R&D spending on productivity is
already found in the literature (see the recent survey by Hall, 2011), there are several reasons to say that further
evidence is welcome in this field. First of all, most works rely on data from the Community Innovation Survey
(CIS), or its imitators in other countries, which, however, provide only cross-sectional information. Second,
although in principle firms always bear a some form of cost when they make choices related to technology and
productivity, it is not always the case that this cost finds place in their balance sheets, as it can happen, for
instance, when innovation takes the form of “in-house R&D” or when a firm simply “imitates” other firms’
techniques. Thus, the explanatory variable can account only for a part of the variation in the dependent
variable. Third, in NNTT models firms are assumed to differ in terms of what we named “tfp” (see eq. (1)),
thus predictions are in “physical” terms (i.e. quantity). Conversely, as explained in the introduction, most of the
literature on innovation and productivity derives results in terms of revenue productivity. We tackle this issue by
focusing on “intangible fixed assets”, rather than on R&D. By including R&D and other costs explicitly oriented
to technology and productivity, intangible assets provide us with a wider description of the effort that a firm
devotes to the final goal of improving her market position (i.e. revenues), in this being more consistent with a
revenue-based dependent variable. Phrased differently, our analysis provides a better understanding of whether
firms systematically use intangible assets to improve their ability to transform inputs into revenues, being this
ability a composition of several ingredients: i) R&D costs borne with the objective to improve productivity, ii)
“absorptive capacity”, that is the Cohen and Levinthal’s (1989) ability to exploit existing technology and to
create new technologies,5 iii) marketing, design and technical specification expenditures borne with the objective
5The literature on “absorptive capacity” usually stresses the learning channel. However, World Bank (2008) highlights that
absorptive capacity also depends on country-level characteristics, such as governance, quality of regulation, legal environment,
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to strengthen the market position.
Having clarified why we focus on intangibles, our main contribution to NNTT literature can be presented
as the following refinement. Provided that intangible assets do have a positive impact on firms’ performance,
does the effect occur through pushing towards using a better (either new or already existing) technology or,
instead, through the tfp component? We show that both channels are important. Consequently, by modeling
firm heterogeneity only in terms of tfp, NNTT models capture only part of the story. A few papers are related to
this part of our analysis. Baily et al. (1992) find, for example, persistence effects on the top of the productivity
distribution, meaning that the more productive firms tend to remain the more productive, also in the presence
of technological progress. Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1998) investigate productivity dynamics in depth, showing
how the transition probabilities among different classes of productivity vary substantially by industry, plant age,
and other characteristics. Differently from the latter, however, our data do not allow us to go into the details
of both the transition dynamics and the aggregate technological progress. Moreover, our results are consistent
with the innovation dynamics described by Klette and Kortum (2004), Luttmer (2007) and, more recently, by
Ko¨nig et al. (2012). Ko¨nig et al., in particular, reproduce real world empirical productivity distributions by
allowing firms to innovate by investing in R&D and/or imitating other firms’ technology. An interesting feature
of their framework is that it takes into account the fact that the return of the innovation activity of the firms
can differ on the basis of their actual technology, depending on its “distance” from the advanced technology, as
recognized by Powell and Grodal (2006). Respect to this literature, we introduce a further dimension, that is
the possibility that firms improve their tfp, without changing technology.
In addition, in our regressions we consider a number of country-, region- and sector-specific variables. For
many of these variables NNTT literature shows theoretical predictions in terms of their final effect on aggregate
productivity. For example, in NNTT models, any exogenous increase in active firms’ average profits (e.g. lower
labour, capital or service costs and better tangible and intangible infrastructure) has the effect to raise the
productivity threshold of survival by stimulating R&D and encouraging more productive firms to enter the
market.
Besides NNTT studies, our analysis closely relates to other veins of literature. First, our work fits with
the body of literature on “technology adoption” (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Aghion et al., 2005; Barro and
political and macroeconomic stability, government actions that help overcome market failures, including supporting R&D and
building infrastructure. In our analysis we introduce controls for many of these factors.
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Sala-i Martin, 1997; Bas, 2012; Desmet and Parente, 2010; Eaton and Kortum, 2001; Hall and Jones, 1999;
Howitt, 2000). Second, our empirical findings corroborate the results of several other papers that have been
analyzing the relationship between intangible assets and productivity. For instance, Marrocu et al. (2011), in a
paper in which data from the same main source as ours (i.e. Amadeus database) are employed, find a positive
influence on firms’ productivity exerted by knowledge capital internal to the firm, as well as by intangible assets
available in the regional economy. A positive effect of intangibles on productivity is detected also by Bontempi
and Mairesse (2008), Corrado et al. (2008), Oliner et al. (2008), and O’Mahony and Vecchi (2009). However,
none of these articles disentangle between technology and tfp and recognizes the importance of allowing for
multiple technologies. Third, we contribute to the literature on theory of the firm and technological change. At
a firm level we provide the first empirical evidence in favor of a negative relationship between being listed and
a firm’s performance, as recently proposed by the theoretical model of Ferreira et al. (2012). Furthermore, our
result of a positive link between firm’s dimension and productivity relates to the well known studies by Pavitt
et al. (1987) and Cohen and Klepper (1996a, 1996b) on the Schumpeterian hypothesis of larger firms being
relatively more innovative. Finally, at a country level, we show a positive effect of stronger worker protection on
tfp, supporting the argument that stringent labour laws protect employees from expropriation by employers and
so create incentives for workers to apply their efforts to learning processes within the firm (Michie and Sheehan,
2003; Acharya et al., 2010).
3 Identifying firms’ technology and tfp
In this section we describe in details how we obtain our dependent variables for Section 4, namely firm’s belonging
to the high technology group, used in the technology adoption regression, and firm-level tfp, used in the tfp
analysis. Our strategy consists of three steps:
− Production function(s) estimation. We estimate the (sector- and technology-specific) coefficients βn,s
in (1) using mixture models. We do so by allowing for the existence of two technology groups (i.e. S = 2).
For each firm, the procedure provides us with the probability to belong to one or the other group. We are
thus able to assign our sample firms to the group they belong with higher probability.
− High/low technologies. We first compute the predicted output of each firm and then use a first order
8
stochastic dominance criterion to identify the more productive technology.
− Firm-level tfp. We compute firm-level tfp as the difference between actual and predicted output (i.e.
Solow residual), given firms’ belonging to a given technology group.
Before to go into the details of each step, it is worth showing in what our approach allows us to depart from
conventional tfp estimates. To this end, imagine for simplicity a one-input production function. It is common
practice in productivity analysis (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; and Ackerberg et al.,
2006) estimating the production function in logarithms by sector and retrieve the term Ai,t as
lnYi,t − βˆlnXi,t = lnAˆi,t (2)
where the input coefficient (β) is estimated without allowing for the presence of different (within-sector) tech-
nologies. With equation (1) in mind, this input coefficient can be seen as the average of the S technology-specific
betas (βs), each weighted by the ratio of the number of firms in the s-technology group to the total number of
firms in the sector. As a consequence, common tfp estimates include a bias which can be easily identified by
using equation (1) to substitute for output in (2) and denoting the “true” tfp and input coefficient as a∗i,t and
β∗s respectively:
lnA∗i,t + (β
∗
s − βˆ)lnXi,t = lnAˆi,t (3)
Thus, tfp estimates obtained without allowing for the presence of different (within-sector) production tech-
nologies conflate technology effects and “proper” tfp. In particular, neglecting such issue results in overstating
the tfp of the firms that adopt relatively more productive technologies (due to underestimation of their input
coefficient - i.e. β∗s > βˆ) and understating the tfp of the firms that adopt relatively less productive technologies
(due to overestimation of their input coefficient - i.e. βˆ > β∗s ).
Assuming that the number of technologies is correctly identified, our approach allows us to obtain tfp
estimates which are not affected by this bias.6
6In order to keep the technology adoption analysis manageable we restrict our benchmark estimation to the presence of two
technologies. However, in Section 5.2 we leave the mixture analysis free to endogenously determine the number of technologies. In
that exercise we can reasonably assume that the bias vanishes (that is β∗s = βˆ∗s ).
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Production function(s) estimation. Production function estimation at the firm level raises a number
of issues. There is a wide literature in this field and several stratagems have been proposed, with the choice
depending on the economic focus (see Del Gatto et al. (2010) and Van Beveren (2012) for overviews on available
methodologies).
Our focus in this paper is on the fact that firms should be allowed to use different technologies. In principle,
as many production functions as the number of available technologies should be estimated. This objective
suggests using mixture models (Mc Lachlan and Peel, 2000). Such approach enables us to cluster our sample
firms across different technologies and, consistently with our framework (cfr. equation (1)), estimate the relevant
coefficients allowing for technology- (or group-)specific input coefficients.
The advantage of mixture models is that they allow us to cluster firms over technologies without any ex-ante
assumption, since the probability to belong to a given technology cluster is produced by the estimation. it is
however with noting that this choice prevents us from taking into account other important issues highlighted
by the literature. In particular, we are not able to deal with the simultaneity bias. In Appendix B we speculate
on the effect of this omission on our estimated coefficients and tfp.
To describe our mixture analysis, let us start by writing the (implicit) probability distribution function of
(1) as a weighted average of the S specific segment (i.e. technology) densities fs(Yi,t|µs, σs), each with proper
mean (µs) and variance (σ2s):
f(Yi,t|µ, σ) =
S∑
s=1
ϕsfs(Yi,t|µs, σ2s). (4)
Weights ϕs measure the ex-ante probability to belong to group s.
Assuming a normal density for fs(Yi,t|µs, σ2s),7 the production function coefficients can be obtained by
maximizing the following loglikelihood function:
lnL =
∑
i
∑
t=1,...T |τ∈[0;1]
ln
∑
s=1,...,S
ϕs(2piσ2s)
− 12 exp
{− (Yi,t − (αs + βK,sKi,t + βL,sLi,t))2
2σ2s
}
(5)
where the mean of fs has been replaced by a linear predictor - i.e. µs = αs + βK,sKi,t + βL,sLi,t - in which the
coefficients are found by the maximization process itself and τ is an indicator variable implying that firm i can
7Or another density belonging to the exponential family (see Wedel and De Sarbo, 1995).
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exists or not at year t.
As the individual probabilities that compose the weights ϕs are unknown, there is basically a problem of
missing data in the maximization of (4). Operatively, the problem is solved through the EM (expectation-
maximization) algorithm of Dempster et al. (1977): the process is run choosing random starting points for ϕs,
then posterior probabilities are computed at each step, which in turn update the regression coefficients (since
weights change).
Posterior probabilities of firm i belonging to group s at time t are thus computed as:
pi,s,t ≡ pr(it ∈ s) = ϕsfs(Yi,t|Ki,t, Li,t; σˆ
2
s , βˆK,s, βˆL,s, αˆs)∑S
s=1 ϕsfs(Yi,t|Ki,t, Li,t; σˆ2s , βˆK,s, βˆL,s, αˆs)
(6)
De Sarbo and Cron (1988) show that maximizing (4) is equivalent to performing a weighted least squares
(WLS) regression with weights given by the segments’ probabilities. We thus solve the maximization problem
by iteratively alternating computation of WLS and probabilities until a loglikelihood convergence criterion is
reached. We repeat the process many times to avoid local optima.
Concerning the number of segments S, which the algorithm is not able to identify, we have to set it ex-ante
and then, after the maximization procedure, to test for the value of S which is most informative. The trade-off
is between a parsimonious solution, without unuseful components, and a good fit of the data, so that there
is a penalization for the additional components that imply more estimated parameters. Here we adopt a two
segments solution (i.e. S = 2). This simplifies the analysis without loss of generality in terms of results. In
Section 5.2 we relax this assumption following Mc Lachlan (1987) and Fraley and Raftery (2002).
The estimation takes advantage of detailed information on value added, tangible fixed assets and number
of employees in the Amadeus database, provided by “Bureau van Dijk”. Descriptive statistics are reported in
Table 1.8
The values of βK,s and βL,s obtained for two groups are reported in Table 2. There is a large difference
between the two clusters, with the first one having higher physical capital coefficient and smaller labour and
intercept coefficients.9 The coefficients are highly significant.
8The data cover the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, UK, Hungary,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovak Republic.
9At a country level, Battisti and Parmeter (2011) found evidence of clusters with high and low physical and human capital
returns.
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As well as with the production function coefficients for each technology s, the procedure provides us, for
each observation (i.e. for each firm in each year), with an attached probability to stay in cluster 1 or 2. Since
these probabilities sum to one, we are able to assign a firm to cluster 1 at time t if pi,1,t > pi,2,t and viceversa for
cluster 2 (hard assignment). It worth noting that the percentage of firms that change group in the period under
consideration is around 10%. None of these firms changes group more than once. We identify which group of
firms uses the best technology in the next step.
High/low technologies. With the estimated coefficients of the two groups in our hands, we can compute
each firm’s predicted output by applying the latter to her actual amount of capital and labour (i.e. lnYˆi,s,t =
αs+βˆK,slnKi,t+βˆL,slnLi,t). This allows us to derive the cumulative distribution function of the two groups and
use a first order stochastic dominance criterion to identify the more productive technology as the technology
with higher mean and variance. For each sector, the cumulative distribution function of the two identified
groups is reported in Figure 1.
It is worth noting how the choice to allow for only two technologies makes the identification of the dominant
technology straightforward, as group 2 first order stochastically dominates group 1 in all sectors. We thus do
not need more sophisticated stochastic dominance tests to start referring to the technology used by cluster 2
as the higher technology (hereinafter technology H), in contrast to the lower technology (hereinafter technology
L), used by firms in group 1.10
This given, we define the two sets of firms adopting technology H and L at time t respectively as:
ΘH ≡ {it : pi,2,t > pi,1,t} and ΘL ≡ {it : pi,1,t > pi,2,t} (7)
The regional distribution of the ratio ΘH/ΘL is reported in Figure 2.
Firm-level tfp. Having computed the predicted output for all the firms on the basis of their group-specific
production coefficients, we are able to calculate each firm’s tfp at time t (i.e. the Solow residual) as Ai,t =
exp(lnYi,t − lnYˆi,s,t) = exp(lnYi,t − αs − βˆK,slnKi,t − βˆL,slnLi,t).
The regional tfp distribution is reported in Figure 3.
10It is worth noting how, in two out of our nine sectors, the technology which our criterium identifies as L presents higher
estimated returns to scale (RSC), compared to technology H (see Table 11), meaning that comparing the RSC of the two clusters
could not be an alternative criterium for the identification of the higher technology.
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Note that, although we assumed the tfp term Ai,t to be only firm-specific in (1), its empirical equivalent is de
facto influenced by the type of technology adopted, as the tfp of the average firm (i.e. the firm whose observed
output exactly matches the output predicted on the basis of her group-specific coefficients βn,s) amounts to one
(i.e. the exponential of zero), with the tfp of all the other firms in the same technology-group expressed with
respect to that benchmark. This is a key point for our contribution. As equation (2) points out, controlling for
the fact that sample firms might use different technologies is in fact a central issue in productivity estimation.
By neglecting this, conventional methods of tfp estimation at the firm-level (e.g. the semi-parametric methods
suggested by Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; and Ackerberg et al., 2006) implicitly proceed
by assuming that all the firms in the sample use the same technology and express the firms’ tfp taking the
average firm in the sector, rather than in the technology group, as benchmark. This is at the basis in (3).11
4 Technology adoption and tfp effects
In this Section we study whether intangible fixed assets, and a number of other firm-, sector-, region- and
country-specific variables, do have an impact on i) firms’ technology adoption, by pushing firms towards better
(either new or already existing) technologies, and ii) tfp, by allowing for a more efficient exploitation of a given
technology.
Information on intangible fixed assets is drawn from Amadeus (see Appendix A). From an accounting point
of view, intangible fixed assets cover patents, copyrights, franchises or licenses, trademarks or trade names, and
goodwill.
We first study firms’ technological choices. With our sample firms allocated to either the high or the low
technology group, firm’s belonging to the high technology group can be used as the dependent variable in a
technology adoption regression. Intangible assets should positively affect a firm’s choice for a high technology,
because they enhance the firm’s knowledge base and consequently improve the firm’s ability to identify and
adopt technology H, i.e. - with reference to equation (1) - the firm’s ability to produce a higher Yi,t keeping
11As known, tfp is a relative notion, which, as such, only makes sense if expressed with respect to a benchmark. Which benchmark
to refer to depends, however, on the reference approach. In this respect, it is key the difference between“frontier” and “non-frontier”
approach. While the former relies on the identification of “best-practice” firms, non-frontier methods provide us with productivity
measures expressed in relative terms with respect to the “average” firm. Although recognizing the importance of the best-practice
analysis, here we mainly focus on the non-frontier approach, as it is the basis of the “semi-parametric” methods suggested by
Olley-Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg et al. (2006), which are the most widely used measures in our
reference literature.
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Ai,t equal.
We then study the effect of intangibles on firms’ tfp. As the tfp measure obtained in Section 3 is expressed
in relative terms with respect to the average firm in the technology group, it can be used as such to study
the impact of intangible assets. Also in this case, we expect to estimate a positive link. With reference to
equation (1), the idea behind this relationship is that, all else being equal, intangible assets should raise the
inputs’ marginal contribution to revenues through the tfp term Ai,t. In other words, intangibles are expected
to increase the firm’s ability to produce a higher Yi,t keeping βn,s equal.
Needless to say, other factors, besides intangibles, can have an effect on the two dependent variables we use
in this analysis. We thus consider a set of controls at a firm, region and country level.
At a firm level, as well as the intangible to tangible assets ratio (Firm Intangibles), which is our main
variable of interest, we consider firms’ age (Firm Age), firms’ dimension, proxied by the level of sales (Firm
Size), and a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is listed in a stock market (Listed F irm). Age and
size should both play a positive influence on high technology adoption and tfp. On the one hand, a higher firm’s
age should imply a greater cumulate knowledge of the technological alternatives available in the industry, on the
other, a larger size should increase the company’s capability to exploit sizeable development laboratories and
equipments (Pavitt et al., 1987; Cohen and Klepper, 1996a, 1996b). Moreover, if firm size is positively related to
market power, it may also increase the firm’s incentives to employ more productive technologies because of pre-
emption motives (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982). Differently, the effect of being listed is expected to be negative.
Under private ownership (i.e. the firm is not listed), insider shareholders, such as a manager-entrepreuner, can
time the market by choosing an early exit after receiving bad signals about production; therefore, managers
are more tolerant of early failures and more inclined to invest in new and more profitable - even if riskier -
projects (Ferreira et al., 2012). In addition, listed companies are relatively more vulnerable to the adoption of
sub-optimal business strategies by activist short-termist shareholders (Kochnar and David, 1996; Sherman et
al., 1998; Hoskisson et al., 2002).
At a regional level, we first of all include the R&D levels of the given region (Regional R&D) and the
neighbouring regions (Neighbouring Regions R&D). With these variables, we aim at measuring R&D spillovers
within and between regions. Previous studies on this issue are numerous and suggest a positive relationship
between R&D spillovers and both technology dynamics and firms’ tfp (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Griliches,
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1992; Ciccone, 2002; Autant-Bernard and Mairesse, 2007). We also include a control for the region’s accessibility
(Region Accessibility). This variable is a measure of the total population reachable from the region, weighted
by the ease of getting the other regions. The rationale for its inclusion is that accessibility might be seen as
a measure of market potential and degree of competition at the same time, with the expected sign depending
on which dimension takes over. On the one hand, in fact, higher accessibility means higher exposure to both
export and import market competition. As NNTT points out (see Section 2), when competition gets fiercer, the
less productive firms are forced to leave the market. This suggests an expected positive sign in the regression.
On the other hand, a higher accessibility entails the chance to target a larger market for the firms located in
the region, with more space for the less productive firms. This induces an expected negative relationship in the
regression.
At a country level, we include a measure of labour cost (Labour Cost) and a set of three institutional
variables. Labour cost can affect the observed technology adoption and tfp through inducing firms selection. The
rationale for including labour costs lies again in the expected more intense selection effects associated with higher
production costs. By cutting firms’ profits, higher labour costs should be associated with a stronger firm selection
and a higher probability to observe a larger share of firms in the H-technology group and/or in the right tail of
the tfp distribution. This would suggest a positive sign in the regressions. As institutional variables, we consider
a measure of employment protection (Country EPL), an index of minority shareholder rights (Shareholder
Rights) and the percentage of independent directors that must be in the board by law (Independent Directors).
The effect of employment protection legislation is difficult to predict ex-ante. Stringent labour laws may
stimulate the adoption of more efficient knowledge intensive production methods, because such laws protect
employees from expropriation by employers and so create incentives for workers to apply their efforts to learning
processes (Michie and Sheehan, 2003; Acharya et al., 2010). However, strong employment protection may favor
employees’ resistance to the use of innovative technologies, if such new production technologies imply job losses
or an increase in the labour burden (Zwick, 2002). Stronger minority shareholder rights should have a negative
effect on our dependent variables, to the extent that minority shareholders use increased voice opportunity for
private gain-seeking causing sub-optimal business strategies (Belloc, 2012). Finally, the presence of independent
directors is expected to exert a positive influence on both technology H adoption and tfp. The involvement of
outside directors in the board should reduce agency costs and consequently improve strategic business decisions
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(Kaplan and Minton, 1994).
While a detailed description of the variables used is reported in Appendix A, we now illustrate our results.
Technology adoption effects. To study whether intangible assets affect firms’ technology adoption, by
pushing firms towards better technologies, we define our dependent variable Group H as follows
Group Hi,t =

1 if it ∈ ΘH
0 if it ∈ ΘL
(8)
and, making covariates explicit, we estimate the following logit model:
Group Hi,t = δ0 + δ1Firm Intangiblesi,t + δ2Firm Agei,t + δ3Listed F irmi,t+
+ δ4Firm Sizei,t + δ5Regional R&Dr,t + δ6Region Accessibilityr,t+
+ δ7Neighbouring Regions R&Dr,t + δ8Labour Costc,t+
+ δ9Country EPLc,t + δ10Shareholder Rightsc,t+
+ δ11Independent Directorsc,t + δ12,...,kSectors+
+ δk+1,...,qCountryc + δq+1,...,wY eart + ui + εi,t (9)
where ui are unobservable firm specific effects and εi,t indicates the residuals. Subscript i refers to firms, r to
regions, c to countries, and t to years.
Results of the logit regression analysis are collected in Table 3. Control variables are added progressively.
Only firm level variables are included in model version 1; both firm level and region level variables are included
in model 2; firm, region and country level variables are included in model 3. In models 4 and 5, we tackle
possible endogeneity of intangibles with respect to technology choice, i.e. reverse causality running from a high
technology adoption in t to the level of intangibles in t. In model version 4, the full set of controls is included, and
the intangibles variable is one-year lagged, so as to circumvent possible simultaneous determination of technology
adoption and intangible assets. Similarly, in model version 5, again, the full set of controls is included, and the
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intangibles variable is instrumented by its one-year lagged values.
Estimates are stable across different model specifications. The level of a firm’s intangibles is shown to push
the firm towards the adoption of the more productive technology, regression coefficients being positive and
strongly significative.
Also all other firm level variables have a statistically significant coefficient. Firm’s age and size have a
positive effect on the firm’s probability of choosing technology H (at 1 percent level of statistical significance),
while being a listed firm has a negative effect (at a level of statistical significance between 1 and 5 percent).
The detected negative effect of being listed on high technology adoption is, to the best our knowledge, the first
empirical evidence in favor of the theoretical predictions recently proposed by Ferreira et al. (2012).
At a regional level, we find that regional R&D has a positive and statistically significant effect (at 1 percent
level), this confirming the relevance of within region R&D activities to firms’ technology choices. At the opposite,
R&D levels of neighbouring regions do not exert a statistically significant influence, while a region’s accessibility
shows only a negligible impact.
At a country level, the average labour cost has an impact, positively affecting the probability of the firm’s
adopting technology H at 1 percent level of statistical significance. This result seems to confirm the presence of
a self-selection process, in which lower technology firms withdraw from the market due to insufficient revenues
when - all else being equal - labour costs are higher. As for institutional country variables, finally, we find that
the mandatory presence of independent directors in the board has a positive effect on the firm’s choice of high
production technology and that minority shareholder rights have a negative effect (again, at 1 percent level of
statistical significance), while employment protection legislations result uninfluential.12
Tfp effects. We now study the effect of intangibles using firm-level tfp as the dependent variable and em-
ploying the same vector of covariates and model structure used in the technology adoption analysis. A standard
Generalized Least Square (GLS) regression is used. Being the dependent variable a relative measure, estimated
coefficients provide information on the direction that an explanatory variable’s change gives to the firm’s move
12In unreported estimations, we have verified that our main findings remain statistically significant also in sector-specific regres-
sions. From this, we can conclude that sector size effects, if present, do not drive our results.
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in the (sector- and technology-specific) tfp distribution.
tfpi,t = γ0 + γ1Firm Intangiblesi,t + γ2Firm Agei,t + γ3Listed F irmi,t+
+ γ4Firm Sizei,t + γ5Regional R&Dr,t + γ6Region Accessibilityr,t+
+ γ7Neighbouring Regions R&Dr,t + γ8Labour Costc,t+
+ γ9Country EPLc,t + γ10Shareholder Rightsc,t+
+ γ11Independent Directorsc,t + γ12,...,kSectors+
+ γk+1,...,qCountryc + γq+1,...,wY eart + ui + ηi,t (10)
where ui are unobservable firm specific effects and ηi,t indicates the residuals. Subscript i refers to firms, r to
regions, c to countries, and t to years.
Results are presented in Table 4. Estimates are broadly similar to those obtained in the technology adoption
analysis. In particular, we find that an increase in the intangible to tangible assets ratio has a positive and
statistically significant effect on tfp, as suggested by previous studies (Bontempi and Mairesse, 2008; Corrado
et al., 2008; Oliner et al., 2008; O’Mahony and Vecchi, 2009). Hence, intangibles are shown to be not only
relevant to firms’ technological choices but also a crucial channel through which firms can increase their ability
to exploit their given technology.
Firm’s age exerts a statistically insignificant influence on tfp, while, similarly to the technology adoption
regressions, being listed results associated to a negative and firm’s size to a positive parameter. The two lat-
ter results are consistent, respectively, with the Ferreira et al.’s (2012) theory of public ownership increasing
incentives to choose conventional projects and with the Schumpeterian argument of larger firms being more
productive. Both a region’s R&D and accessibility have a positive and statistically significant - albeit small -
impact on tfp, i.e. within region R&D spillovers and a region’s infrastructures to access other regions’ markets
boost firms’ production performance given the technology. At a country level, we observe a positive effect of
stronger employment protection laws and of the presence of mandatory independent directors in the company’s
board, and a negative effect of minority shareholder rights, thus confirming the similar results of, respectively,
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Acharya et al. (2010), Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Belloc (2012). Specifically, Acharya et al. (2010) present
cross-country evidence showing that stringent dismissal laws provide firms a commitment device to not punish
short-run failures and thereby spur employees’ effort to pursue value-enhancing innovative practices in the pro-
duction process; Kaplan and Minton (1994) show that outside directors significantly decrease agency costs in
the firm, by improving monitoring and discipline of managers; Belloc (2012) finds that stronger minority share-
holder intervention power in the general meetings causes coordination failures in strategic business decisions,
consequently reducing firms’ ability to develop innovative products. Finally, analogously to the technology
effects analysis we find that higher labour costs are associated to a positive and significant parameter. Again,
this suggests that firms self-select, withdrawing from the market if their tfp is not high enough to compensate
for relatively high labour costs.
5 Robustness checks
5.1 Clustering over sub-periods
We test here an alternative specification of the mixture model we used in the production function analysis. We
analyze whether the panel nature of the data affects our estimated capital and labour input coefficients, and in
turn the technology adoption and tfp regressions.
A problem may arise in our benchmark estimation due to the fact that we pooled observations together - as
they were independent - in order to allow free transitions over time. We now run a robustness check estimation
by introducing firm-specific effects accounting for time dependency at the firm level.13 At the same time,
however, we again want to allow for transitions across groups. We therefore split the sample in two sub-periods
(2003-2005 and 2006-2009), so that firms are allowed to change technology (once) in the whole period. This
two sub-periods structure holds under the assumption that production function’s changes, if any, do not occur
in the short run. This strategy is consistent with the low number of transitions we found in the benchmark full
i.i.d. estimation.
Results obtained from this robustness check are presented in Table 5 and Table 6. Table 5 presents the
estimated inputs’ coefficients by sector, while Table 6 shows the technology adoption and tfp regressions re-run
13This follows the same logic of the longitudinal clustering of McNicholas and Murphy (2010), although their approach doesn’t
work for multivariate density or regressions.
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by using the new clustering and inputs’ coefficients. First, we find that coefficients’ estimates presented in Table
5 are virtually unchanged with respect to the basic results showed in Table 2. We observe a slight reduction of
the capital coefficients from the first to the second sub-period. Nevertheless, this reduction is rather small, with
the only exception of sector OTR, where the drop in the capital coefficient’s size is due to the small number of
observations (85) we have in the first sub-period. Second, we observe from Table 6 that the estimated effects
of the considered explanatory variables on both technology adoption and tfp are substantially similar to those
estimated in the basic model specifications presented in Table 3 and Table 4. Notice that, in the robustness
check presented in Table 6, we have employed a model specification in which the full set of controls is included
and the intangibles variable is instrumented by its one-year lagged values.14
5.2 Flexible number of clusters
We used two clusters in our main specification of the mixture analysis, for sake of simplicity and because they
are much more interpretable in the second step (i.e. technology adoption regression). Here we show how,
by following a sound statistical criterion and choosing a different number of clusters, things do not change
dramatically, so that by a qualitative point of view the implications are still the same and by a quantitative
point of view there are only minor changes. We follow here a log-likelihood ratio (LR) boostrapped test (Mc
Lachlan, 1987)15. The LR test proceeds to boostrap replications of the model and then tests as a chi-square
the difference about the log-likelihoods of two solutions (e.g. 2 and 3 segments).
The findings are as follows. Table 7 shows LR test results with respect to the alternative hypothesis that the
number of segments is greater than a given S, with decisive highlighted. We observe that the LR test suggests
to adopt two components in one out of nine sectors, three components in five sectors, and four components
in three sectors. Table 8, then, shows the inputs’ coefficients for each cluster and sector, which result from
the estimation of as much production functions as the number of segments suggested by the LR test. Inputs’
coefficients show some variability across clusters, but they generally remain on economically meaningful values.
14In an additional robustness check we have verified also if ex-ante probabilities are explained by omitted drivers, so-called
concomitant variables (Dayton and Macready, 1988). If omitted variables drive the clustering process, then the groups composition
may be altered. In particular, we consider a vector of concomitant variables containing intangible fixed assets and firm’s age. We
thus can test whether underlying sources of clustering, omitted in our basic mixture analysis, cause probability values substantially
different from the random maximised ones we used before. We observe that concomitant variables act on clustering probabilities
differently across sectors. Nonetheless, we also find that the relative size of the clusters is very similar to the one showed in Table
2. This suggests that initial random assignment does not affect the final clustering. Tables of results of this robustness check are
available upon request.
15Other alternatives linked to log-likelihood penalization as the MAIC - Modified Akaike Information Criterion (Hawkins et al.,
2001) and the classical Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Fraley and Raftery, 2002) still give equivalent results.
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Finally, we re-obtained for each firm her tfp, by using the new inputs’ coefficients, and re-run tfp regressions.
Results are presented in Table 9. We find that the estimated coefficients of our main explanatory variables are
broadly similar, in their same sign and statistical significance, to those obtained in our basic estimation (see
Table 4). Hence, adding components does not seem to introduce significant gains in the analysis of the relation
between intangibles and tfp.
Since a number of segments higher than two makes it difficult to order the technology groups (see Section
3), we can conclude from this robustness check that assuming S = 2 is the best option among a slightly better
description of the relationships of interest - i.e. more components - and a better interpretation - i.e. less
components -.
This notwithstanding, it is worth noting that, if one were only interested in the best identification of the
tfp term, the procedure suggested in this Section provides with the best solution to the bias problem described
by equation (3), as we can reasonably assume that the estimated production function coefficients are such that
β∗s ' βˆs.
6 Conclusions
Intangible assets play an increasingly important role in modern knowledge intensive production (Bontempi and
Mairesse, 2008; Corrado et al., 2008; Oliner et al., 2008; O’Mahony and Vecchi, 2009). For example, Marrocu
et al. (2011) have recently showed that intangibles could act as an input - like tangible fixed assets - in a
production function, contributing with a positive and statistically significant coefficient. However, despite this
growing interest by economists, it has been unclear so far whether intangibles can allow for a more efficient
exploitation of a firm’s “traditional” inputs (i.e. tangible fixed capital and labour) or they help the firm at
identifying and adopting more productive technologies, or both. Such gap in previous studies stems from the
fact that traditional estimates of tfp are obtained under the assumption of firms using a single given technology.
This, besides imposing a strong limitation to the tfp estimation (i.e. a unique production function for all
firms), also precludes the possibility to analyze firms’ technological choices. In this paper, we have proposed
an empirical strategy that allows for multiple technologies. We have found that intangibles have a positive and
statistically significant effect on both the firm’s probability of choosing relatively more productive technologies
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and tfp. This result adds at least to two veins of literature. On the one hand, we contribute to the discussion
currently taking place within the NNTT literature on if and how firms can influence their tfp in a dynamic
innovation framework by paying additional costs. We show that a firm’s effort, in terms of increasing her
endowment of intangible assets, is worth it. On the other hand, we refine the literature on intangibles and firms’
productivity by disentangling the positive influences that intangible assets have independently on technology
adoption and tfp.
Apart from unveiling the effects of intangibles on firm’s production abilities, our empirical strategy provides a
methodological contribution to tfp estimation. We have showed that, in our sample of European manufacturing
firms, the traditional assumption of all firms using a unique production function is rejected by the mixture
analysis of the data. Even within the same sector, firms choose different technologies (i.e. different production
functions).
Admittedly, the advantage of allowing for multiple production functions through mixture models comes at
a price. The fact that mixture analysis operates by means of WLS hampers the possibility to control for other
sources of bias highlighted by the recent literature on productivity estimation. It is thus in our agenda to enrich
our approach by controlling for the simultaneity bias.
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A Variables description
Added Value. Log of added value. Added value is defined as profit for period + depreciation + taxation +
interests paid + cost of employees. This is a firm-level variable, covering years from 2003 to 2009, which we
deflated using the OECD-Stan sector-country specific deflators (source: Amadeus (2012))
Labour Input. Log of total number of employees included in the company’s payroll. This is a firm-level
variable, covering years from 2003 to 2009, which we deflated using the OECD-Stan sector-country specific
deflators (source: Amadeus (2012))
Capital Input. Log of tangible assets. Tangible assets include buildings, machinery and all other tangible
assets. This is a firm-level variable, covering years from 2003 to 2009, which we deflated using the OECD-Stan
sector-country specific deflators. (source: Amadeus (2012))
Firm Intangibles. Log of intangible to tangible assets ratio. Intangible assets include formation expenses,
research expenses, goodwill, development expenses. Tangible assets include buildings, machinery and all tangible
assets. This is a firm-level variable, covering years from 2003 to 2009. (source: Amadeus (2012))
Firm Age. Age of the firm (years). This is a firm-level variable, covering years from 2003 to 2009. (source:
Amadeus (2012))
Listed Firm. Dummy variable (1 = the firm is listed in the stock market, 0 = otherwise). This is a firm-level
variable, covering years from 2003 to 2009. (source: Amadeus (2012))
Sales. Log of net sales. This is a firm-level variable, covering years from 2003 to 2009, which we deflated
using the OECD-Stan sector-country specific deflators. (source: Amadeus (2012))
Regional R&D. Total intramural R&D expenditure. This is a region-level variable, covering years from 2003
to 2009, expressed in Purchasing Power Standard per inhabitant at constant 2000 prices. ”Total” refer to the
fact that the variable cover: i) business enterprise sector, ii) government sector, iii) higher education sector, iv)
private non-profit sector. (source: Eurostat (2012))
Region Accessibility. Multi-modal potential accessibility, std. This is a region-level variable, covering 2001
and 2006 (source: Espon database). The variable is defined as Accj =
∑
r Poprexp(−βc¯jr), where the term c¯jr
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refers to the aggregation over transport modes (air, rail, road) of the cost of reaching region r from region j -
i.e. c¯jr = −(1/λ)ln
∑
m exp(−λcjrm), where index m refers to the transportation mode, and λ is a parameter
indicating the sensitivity to travel cost. The interpretation is that the greater the number of ”attractive desti-
nations” in areas r is, and the more accessible areas r are from area j, the greater is the accessibility of area
j.
Neighbouring Regions R&D. This is a region-level variable, covering years from 2003 to 2009. With R&D
defined as above, this variable is derived as a local clusters indicator, of the class known as ”Gi* statistics”
(Anselin, 1995). These are defined as indexes of spatial clustering of a set of observations. They are the ratio of
the sum of a variable over the neighbours to the total sum of the variable within the sample. The variable we
use is the R&D expenses and the spatial framework are the EU27 regions plus Norway and Switzerland. The
numerator is computed over a defined neighborhood that depends by the weight distance matrix. In our case,
the number of allowed neighbours is set as k = 4 (we obtain similar results with k=3,5,...,10). (source: authors’
own calculation on Eurostat (2012) data)
Labour Cost. Hourly labour costs, manufacturing. This is a country-level variable, covering years from 2003
to 2008 (source: Eurostat (2012)).
Country EPL. Unweighted average of sub-indicators for regular contracts (EPR) and temporary contracts
(EPT). EPR covers notification procedures, delay involved before notice can start, length of notice period at
9 months / 4 years / 20 years of tenure, severance pay at 9 months / 4 years / 20 years of tenure, definition
of justified or unfair dismissal, length of trial period, compensation following unfair dismissal, possibility of
reinstatement following unfair dismissal. EPT covers valid cases for use of fixed-term contracts, maximum
number of successive fixed-term contracts, maximum cumulated duration of successive fixed-term contracts,
types of work for which temporary work agency employment is legal, restrictions on number of renewals of
temporary work agency contracts, maximum cumulated duration of successive temporary work agency contracts.
The summary indicator is on a scale from 0 (least restrictions) to 6 (most restrictions). This is a country-level
variable, covering years from 2003 to 2008 (source: OECD (2012)).
Shareholder Rights. Unweighted sum of 3 sub-indicators. Sub-indicator 1 equals 1 if the sale of more than
50% of the company’s assets requires approval of the general meeting, equals 0.5 if the sale of more than 80%
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of the assets requires approval, equals 0 otherwise. Sub-indicator 2 equals 1 if shareholders who hold 1% or less
of the capital can put an item on the agenda, equals 0.75 if there is a hurdle of more than 1% but not more
than 3%; equals 0.5 if there is a hurdle of more than 3% but not more than 5%, equals 0.25 if there is a hurdle
of more than 5% but not more than 10%, equals 0 otherwise. Sub-indicator 3 equals 1 if every shareholder can
file a claim against a resolution by the general meeting, equals 0.5 if there is a threshold of 10% voting rights,
equals 0 if this kind of shareholder action does not exist. This is a country-level variable, covering years from
2003 to 2005 (source: Siems et al. (2009)).
Independent Directors. Equals 1 if at least half of the board members must be independent, equals 0.5 if
25% of them must be independent, equals 0 otherwise. This is a country-level variable, covering years from
2003 to 2005 (source: Siems et al. (2009)).
Table 10 provides a synthetic description of the variables used in the analysis.
B Simultaneity bias
In Section 3 we stressed the fact that the presence of different technologies should be allowed for in productivity
analysis. On the one hand, by estimating technology-specific coefficients, this removed, or at least softened,
the associated bias in the estimates. On the other hand, however, using mixture models prevented us from
controlling for other important sources of bias which the literature in this field has been highlighting. In
particular, we have been forced to neglect the fact that information on actual tfp, although unknown to the
econometrician, is to some extent included in the information set of the firm when the decision concerning the
amount of inputs is made. If this is the case, our production function parameters, which are obtained through
WLS, are biased due to the correlation between the regressors and the error term.
To tackle this problem, commonly referred to as “simultaneity”, in this Section we re-estimate the production
function coefficients following the semi-parametric approach suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996). Moreover,
as the Olley-Pakes method assumes that labour is a fully variable input, we use the more realistic correction
suggested by Ackerberg et al. (2006) and adopt the acronym OPACF to refer to the resulting estimation
procedure. For more details on the Olley-Pakes routine the reader is redirected to Del Gatto et al. (2010).
Our estimation strictly follows the description in their Section 5.2.1. Although not being a “proper” robustness
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check, this exercise can give a sense of the difference in terms of estimated coefficients and tfp, respect to our
mixture regressions.
As a first comparison, we report in Table 11 the coefficients estimated, for the whole sample, through
the OPACF method, and compare them with those obtained through a simple OLS estimation. The latter
estimation is equivalent to a one-group mixture regression.
A first information from this table is that, as expected, OLS estimates are always in the middle, compared
to the mixture-based coefficients obtained in the two-groups case (see Table 2). This is just a consequence of
the fact that βˆn =
∑S
s=1 βˆn,s
Θs∑S
s=1 Θs
A second information is that no clear pattern emerges form the comparison of the OPACF with the OLS
coefficients, neither in terms of RSC, nor in terms of capital/labour coefficients ratio. This might be interpreted
as evidence of the fact that the simultaneity bias does not affect our results in a given direction.
As a further check, we re-compute firms’ tfp using OPACF within the two groups, as identified by the
mixture analysis. While at first sight this might seem a good strategy, it presents several drawbacks. First, it is
not correct to reduce the mixture regressions to a first step aimed at identifying the groups, as firms’ belonging
to one or the other group is endogenous to the production function estimation. In other words, firms that fall
in one group might fall in the other group in an ideal “simultaneity free” mixture regression. Second, the Olley-
Pakes procedure requires information on firms’ investments, and this dramatically reflects onto the number of
observations, which shrinks by even 2/3, so making impossible to replicate the benchmark regressions. This
notwithstanding, we re-compute firms’ tfp by technology groups, using the Olley-Pakes coefficients reported in
Table 11. Interestingly enough, the correlation with the mixture-based tfp is around 0.7 for both technologies.
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Table 1: Amadeus dataset, size and sectoral composition after data cleaning.
SECTOR SECTOR CODE N. OBSERVATIONS N. FIRMS
Chemical products (including pharmaceuticals) CH 13578 3366
Rubber and plastic products RP 10274 2714
Other non-metallic products ONM 7711 2021
Basic metals BM 2867 812
Metal products (except machinary and equipment) ME 8371 2293
Electronic, electrical and optical products EL 13380 3701
Machinary and equipment MA 16248 4477
Motor vehicles and trailers MV 3604 1025
Other transport equipment OTR 1308 384
TOTAL - 77341 20793
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Table 2: Mixture regression, 2 technology clusters - S = 2 (dep. var.: Added Value).
Cluster 1 Cluster 2
SECTOR K L const K L const
CH coeffs 0,353*** 0,454*** -0,536*** 0,183*** 0,775*** 0,050***
st.err. (0,039) (0,039) (0,040) (0,005) (0,006) (0,106)
n.obs 553 13301
RP coeffs 0,477*** 0,426*** -0,410*** 0,153*** 0,797*** 0,134***
st.err. (0,020) (0,020) (0,021) (0,006) (0,006) (0,004)
n.obs 1422 9106
ONM coeffs 0,550*** 0,290*** -0,380*** 0,260*** 0,700*** 0,110***
st.err. (0,026) (0,247) (0,027) (0,007) (0,008) (0,004)
n.obs 944 6960
BM coeffs 0,537*** 0,322*** -0,574*** 0,249*** 0,640*** 0,256***
st.err. (0,037) (0,039) (0,044) (0,013) (0,012) (0,006)
n.obs 671 2297
ME coeffs 0,479*** 0,243*** -0,673*** 0,160*** 0,706*** 0,314***
st.err. (0,019) (0,021) (0,022) (0,006) (0,006) (0,004)
n.obs 2098 6525
EL coeffs 0,453 0,348*** -0,385*** 0,040*** 0,909*** 0,155***
st.err. (0,348) (0,018) (0,017) (0,007) (0,008) (0,004)
n.obs 2132 11652
MA coeffs 0,433*** 0,312*** -0,516*** 0,071*** 0,880*** 0,142***
st.err. (0,018) (0,017) (0,016) (0,004) (0,005) (0,003)
n.obs 2182 14535
MV coeffs 0,493*** 0,513*** -0,362*** 0,169*** 0,751*** 0,204***
st.err. (0,025) (0,027) (0,026) (0,013) (0,013) (0,007)
n.obs 980 2723
OTR coeffs 0,364** 0,574*** -0,554*** 0,106** 0,795*** 0,172***
st.err. (0,095) (0,092) (0,056) (0,018) (0,018) (0,008)
n.obs 232 1120
***,**,* significant values at 99, 95, 90%
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Table 3: Technology adoption effects, baseline regression results.
1 2 3 4 5
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.)
Firm Intangibles 0.074*** 0.091*** 0.121*** - -
(0,015) (0,018) (0,030)
Firm Intangiblest−1 - - - 0.143*** -
(0,036)
Firm Intangibles (instrumented) - - - - 0.045***
(0,009)
Firm Age 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.006***
(0,002) (0,003) (0,004) (0,005) (0,001)
Listed F irm -1.799*** -1.844*** -1.518** -1.147** -0.464**
(0,306) (0,400) (0,624) (0,741) (0,196)
Firm Size 1.063*** 1.143*** 0.761*** 0.803*** 0.227***
(0,042) (0,049) (0,070) (0,078) (0,018)
Regional R&D - 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Region Accessibility - 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000**
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Neighbouring Regions R&D - -20.287 17.183 -19.110 -7.889
(29,430) (43,230) (48,880) (13,015)
Labour Cost - 0.939*** 0.978*** 0.309***
(0,324) (0,323) (0,115)
Country EPL - - -1.266 -0.915 -0.235
(1,418) (1,447) (0,542)
Shareholder Rights - - -4.265*** -4.382*** -1.254**
(1,355) (1,143) (0,497)
Independent Directors - - 3.947*** 5.206*** 1.414***
(1,425) (1,482) (0,544)
Constant -1.369*** -14.777*** -17.021* -18.788** -6.150*
(0,580) (0,685) (8,889) (9,058) (3,260)
Firm effects yes yes yes yes no
Country effects yes yes yes yes yes
Sector effects yes yes yes yes yes
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes
Number of obs. 59728 38657 16191 15142 15121
Dependent variable: firm-level Group H
Estimation method: LOGIT
***,**,* significant values at 99, 95, 90%
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Table 4: tfp effects, baseline regression results.
1 2 3 4 5
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.)
Firm Intangibles 0,011*** 0,013*** 0,012*** - -
(0,001) (0,001) (0,001)
Firm Intangibles t-1 - - - 0,013*** -
(0,001)
Firm Intangibles (instrumented) - - - 0,013***
(0,001)
Firm Age -0,000 -0,000 -0,000 0,000 0,000
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Listed Firm -0,126*** -0,124*** -0,114*** -0,121*** -0,121***
(0,016) (0,020) (0,025) (0,026) (0,026)
Firm Size 0,103*** 0,099*** 0,077*** 0,079*** 0,079***
(0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,003) (0,003)
Regional R&D - 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000***
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Region Accessibility - 0,000*** 0,000** 0,000** 0,000**
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Neighbouring Regions R&D - 1,200 0,228 -0,268 -0,313
(1,343) (1,687) (1,770) (1,765)
Labour Cost - - 0,041*** 0,045*** 0,044***
(0,010) (0,009) (0,009)
Country EPL - - 0,423*** 0,457*** 0,451***
(0,055) (0,055) (0,055)
Shareholder Rights - - -0,365*** -0,375*** -0,380***
(0,038) (0,038) (0,038)
Independent Directors - - 0,529*** 0,540*** 0,541***
(0,044) (0,045) (0,045)
Constant -1,309*** -1,261*** -2,121*** -2,298*** -2,254***
(0,029) (0,032) (0,271) (0,274) (0,276)
Firm effects yes yes yes yes yes
Country effects yes yes yes yes yes
Sector effects yes yes yes yes yes
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes
Number of obs. 59728 38657 16191 15242 15121
Dependent variable: firm-level tfp
Estimation method: GLS
***,**,* significant values at 99, 95, 90%
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Table 6: Robustness, re-run estimation with clustering over sub-periods.
Technology tfp
adoption effects
effects
Coeff. Coeff.
Firm Intangibles (instrumented) 0.058*** 0.012***
Firm Age 0.005*** 0.000
Listed Firm -0.528*** -0.115***
Sales 0.265*** 0.080***
Region Accessibility 0.000* 0.000*
Neighbouring Regions R&D 16.105 -1.131
Regional R&D 0.001*** 0.000**
Labour Cost -0.037 0.055***
Country EPL -0.178 0.358***
Shareholder Rights -0.181 -0.488***
Independent Directors -0.075 0.690***
Constant -2.159*** -2.131***
Firm effects not yes
Country effects yes yes
Sector effects yes yes
Year effects yes yes
Number of obs. 15363 15363
Dependent variable: Group H tfp
Estimation method: Logit GLS
***,**,* significant values at 99, 95, 90%
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Table 7: Robustness, flexible number of clusters - LR test.
SECTOR LR (S=1) LR (S=2) LR (S=3) LR (S=4)
CH 0.05 0.05 0.25
RP 0.02 0.02 0.38
ONM 0.02 0.02 0.71
BM 0.02 0.08
ME 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.29
EL 0.02 0.04 0.58
MA 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.52
MV 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.57
OTR 0.02 0.04 0.54
LR = log-likelihood ratio test values for H0 : numb. of segments = S,H1 : numb. of segments > S
Boostrapped test computed over 25 replications of the basic model that had 100 replications
Decisive tests in boldface. S = 3 in sector MA based on insignificant βk in the S = 4 specification.
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Table 9: Robustness, flexible number of clusters - re-run tfp estimation.
1 2 3 4 5
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Firm Intangibles 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012***
Firm Intangibles t-1 0.012***
Firm Intangibles (instrumented) 0.012***
Firm Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Listed Firm -0.165*** -0.128*** -0.139*** -0.159*** -0.160***
Sales 0.116*** 0.123*** 0.092*** 0.095*** 0.096***
Region Accessibility 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Neighbouring Regions R&D -0.301 0.263 -0.96 -0.993
Regional R&D 0.000 0.000** 0.000* 0.000*
Labour Cost 0.051*** 0.056*** 0.057***
Country EPL 0.380*** 0.382*** 0.380***
Shareholder Rights -0.081 -0.086 -0.093
Independent Directors 0.207** 0.226** 0.228***
Constant -1.258*** -1.259*** -2.732*** -2.826*** -2.839***
Firm effects yes yes yes yes yes
Country effects yes yes yes yes yes
Sector effects yes yes yes yes yes
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes
Number of obs. 52141 34455 14372 13678 13662
Dependent variable: firm-level tfp
Estimation method: GLS
***,**,* significant values at 99, 95, 90%
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Figure 1: Predicted output, cumulative distribution functions by sector
43
 Figure 2: High to low technology firms ratio (ΘH/ΘL), regional values.
44
Figure 3: Firms’ tfp distribution, regional averages.
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